

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 2262

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, UR, TU
SUBJ: MFA COMMENTS ON FONMIN'S VISIT TO SOVIET UNION

REF: A) MOSCOW 3789, B) ANKARA 2065

1. MFA EASTERN DEPT DIRECTOR ASENA HAS GIVEN US FOLLOWING
COMMENTS ON RESULTS OF FONMIN CAGLAYANGIL'S VISIT TO THE USSR
MARCH 13-17.

2. ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS: THE TWO ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS
MENTIONED IN THE COMMUNIQUE HAD BEEN WORKED OUT DURING THE
DECEMBER VISIT TO MOSCOW OF MINENERGY KILIC, ASENA SAID.
BOTH ARE GENERAL IN NATURE, HE EMPHASIZED, AND DO NOT NAME
SPECIFIC PROJECTS. KILIC HAD TAKEN TO MOSCOW A LIST OF PROJECTS
FOR WHICH TURKEY WANTED SOVIET ASSISTANCE, WITH A TOTAL VALUE
OF ABOUT \$1.2 BILLION. UNDER THE AGREEMENT ON SCIENTIFIC
AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION, A TURKISH-SOVIET MIXED
COMMISSION (ESTABLISHED BY A 1975 AGREEMENT) WILL STUDY
THESE PROJECTS AND SEEK AGREEMENT ON HOW THEY CAN BE
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IMPLEMENTED. HE AGAIN STRESSED, HOWEVER, THAT THERE
HAD BEEN NO FINAL DECISION REACHED ON SPECIFIC AID PROJECTS.

3. ANTI-HIJACKING AGREEMENT: THE ANTI-HIJACKING
AGREEMENT WHICH CAGLAYANGIL SIGNED WITH THE SOVIETS,
ASENA OBSERVED, WAS SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT FROM THE
AGREEMENTS ON THIS SUBJECT WHICH THE SOVIETS HAD NEGO-

TIATED WITH IRAN AND AFGHANISTAN. UNDER THE LATTER TWO AGREEMENTS, RETURN OF EVERY HIJACKED AIRCRAFT TO THE ORIGINATING COUNTRY IS OBLIGATORY. BY CONTRAST, UNDER THE TURKISH-SOVIET ACCORD, THE LAWS OF THE RECEIVING COUNTRY WILL BE APPLIED. THUS IT WOULD BE UP TO A TURKISH COURT TO DECIDE WHETHER TO RETURN A HIJACKED SOVIET AIRCRAFT TO THE USSR. THE DECISION OF A COURT IN SUCH A MATTER PROBABLY WOULD REST ON A DETERMINATION WHETHER THE HIJACKING WAS A "NORMAL" CRIMINAL ACTION, IN WHICH CASE THE AIRCRAFT AND HIJACKERS WOULD BE RETURNED, OR WHETHER IT WAS A POLITICAL ACTION, WHICH WOULD BE GROUNDS FOR REFUSING RETURN. OVERALL, ASENA OBSERVED, THE ANTI-HIJACKING AGREEMENT COULD BE BEST CHARACTERIZED AS SIMPLY AN UNDERTAKING TO COOPERATE IN THE PREVENTION OF HIJACKING.

4. CONSULAR AGREEMENT: THE TWO SIDES HAVE BEEN WORKING SINCE 1969 ON A CONSULAR AGREEMENT, WHICH THE USSR HAS LONG DESIRED. THE AGREEMENT COULD NOT BE SIGNED DURING THE VISIT BECAUSE THERE ARE STILL SOME POINTS ON WHICH IT HAS BEEN IMPOSSIBLE TO REACH AGREEMENT, ASENA SAID.

5. POLITICAL DOCUMENT: ASENA CONFIDED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD VERY MUCH WANTED TO DISCUSS THE PENDING TURKISH-SOVIET POLITICAL DOCUMENT DURING CAGLAYANGIL'S VISIT, BUT THE LATER HAD REFUSED TO ENTER INTO ANY SUCH DISCUSSION. AS A RESULT, THE COMMUNIQUE REPEATS ON THIS POINT EXACTLY THE LANGUAGE OF THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED FOLLOWING THE KOSYGIN VISIT TO ANKARA IN DECEMBER 1975. ASENA SAID THAT THE HAD GONE TO MOSCOW BEFORE THE VISIT TO PREPARE THE COMMUNIQUE WITH CONFIDENTIAL

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HIS SOVIET COUNTERPARTS. THE COMMUNIQUE NEGOTIATIONS HAD LASTED A TOTAL OF 55 HOURS SPREAD OVER NINE DAYS. THE SOVIETS' PRIME INTEREST DURING THESE NEGITOACTIONS WAS THE POLITICAL DOCUMENT. WHEN ASKED WHAT THE SOVIETS WANTED TO INCLUDE IN THE POLITICAL DOCUMENT, ASENA DID NOT ANSWER DIRECTLY, BUT REFERRED TO THE PARAGRAPH ON TURKEY IN BRESHNEV'S SPEECH TO THE CPSU CONGRESS, IN WHICH BRESHNEV HAD NOTED THAT ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH TURKEY HAD DEVELOPED SUCCESSFULLY, AND IT WAS TIME FOR DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL RELATIONS. BRESHNEV HAD ALSO MENTIONED TURKEY AMONG THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES RATHER THAN, AS IN HIS PREIOUS SPEECH, AMONG THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.

6. US-SOVIET REALTIONS: ASENA NOTED THAT GROMYKO HAD SAID THAT SINCE US-SOVIET RELATIONS WERE OF INTEREST TO TURKEY, HE WANTED TO MAKE SOME COMMENTS ON THIS SUBJECT. GROMYKO SAID THAT THE USSR WANTED TO CONTINUE WITH DETENTE DESPITE "RECENT STATEMENTS BY THE NEW US ADMINISTRATION". HOWEVER, THE USSR WAS WAITING TO SEE

WHAT POSITION THE US ADOPTED. GROMYKO SAID THAT THE US SOMETIMES TRIES TO TEACH THE SOVIETS SOME LESSONS (A REFERENCE TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE) AND THAT THIS EFFORT WAS AN INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS. AS REGARDS SALT, GROMYKO SAID THAT THE USSR HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THE US WANTS TO DO AWAY WITH THE VLADIVOSTOK ACCORD, AN ACT WHICH THE USSR REGARDED AS NOT IN THE INTERESTS OF EITHER COUNTRY. THE USSR BELIEVES, GROMYKO TOLD THE TURKS, THAT THE USG WANTS TO HAVE BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE USSR BUT SIMPLY DOES NOT KNOW WHAT POLICY TO FOLLOW YET.

7. OVERALL ASSESSMENT: IN GENERAL, ASENA SAID, CAGLAYANGIL'S VISIT WENT WELL, AND A COOPERATIVE ATMOSPHERE PREVAILED. HOWEVER, THE TURKS WERE TROUBLED BY COMMENTS WHICH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO MADE AT A LUNCH FOR CAGLAYANGIL. GROMYKO SAID THAT THE USSR WANTED TO DEVELOP RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES
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"UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF THE 1921 SOVIET-TURKISH AGREEMENT". ASENA NOTED THAT THE CONDITIONS OF 1921, WHEN TURKEY WAS FIGHTING FOR ITS DEPENDENCE AND HAD TO TURN TO THE SOVIETS FOR HELP BECAUSE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WERE HELPING ITS ADVERSARY, WERE NOT AT ALL THE SAME AS TODAY'S SITUATION, WHEN TURKEY IS A NATO ALLY. BUT ASIDE FROM THIS NOTE OF UNREALISM, HE SAID, NO ASPECT OF THE VISIT HAD CAUSED THE TURKS ANY PARTICULAR CONCERN. HE SAID THAT THE TURKS WERE PLEASED WITH THEMSELVES FOR HAVING AVOIDED LETTING THE SOVIETS INSERT A CLAUSE IN THE COMMUNIQUE CONCERNING NON-FIRST-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AS HAD BEEN DONE IN A RECENT ITALIAN-SOVIET COMMUNIQUE.
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